s Patients displaying mild symptoms of Alzheimer's disease sometimes have more difªculty naming items from an artifact than from a natural kind category; others displaying more severe symptoms almost always have more difªculty naming items from a natural kind than from an artifact category. This paper examined a computational model of this double dissociation (Devlin, Gonnerman, Andersen, & Seidenberg, 1998) . Four basic tests of the model were proposed: The model should be able to generalize to new exemplars, the model should be expandable such that training sets of a realistic size can be used, the model's performance should not be unduly affected by small changes in architecture, and the learning algorithm should produce results that are not inconsistent with any major underlying factor of semantic organization. The model was found to be deªcient in all four areas. Results reported from the model may therefore have been idiosyncratic to the model and not reºect general properties of a real semantic system. s
INTRODUCTION
Category-speciªc deªcits are an aspect of semantic memory that have come under considerable attention (e.g., Farah & McClelland, 1991; Gonnerman, Andersen, Devlin, Kempler, & Seidenberg, 1997; Warrington & McCarthy, 1983 , 1987 Warrington & Shallice, 1984) . Such deªcits are categorized by an inability to recall items of a speciªc category. They can occur from a number of different sources, including disease (e.g., Gonnerman et al., 1997; Silveri, Daniele, Giustolisi, & Gainotti, 1991; Warrington & Shallice, 1984) and neurological damage (e.g., Farah, McMullen, & Meyer, 1991; Sartori & Job, 1988 ). An interesting observation that has been made about such deªcits is that double dissociations between categories exist. Such double dissociations occur when a person shows a deªcit in one category but not another, whereas another person shows the opposite pattern in the categories in which they are deªcient.
One explanation of category-speciªc deªcits is based on the idea that people rely on feature representations when recognizing objects (Farah & McClelland, 1991; Warrington & McCarthy, 1983 , 1987 Warrington & Shallice, 1984) . The individual features that the representations consist of represent different properties that allow the description and discrimination of individual examples (see Warrington and McCarthy, 1987) . It has been suggested that some of the feature types are anatomically distinct (e.g., Damasio, Grabowski, Tranel, Hichwas, & Damasio, 1996; Martin, Wiggs, Ungerleider, & Haxby, 1996) . This would suggest that when localized damage occurs, different types of features can be damaged to a different extent. Such localized damage would mean that the recall of items from different categories would change depending on the damaged features. Items from categories that were learned in such a way that their representations typically included the damaged features would be more difªcult to recall than items from categories whose representations did not include the damaged features.
Neuroanatomically distinct brain regions for representing different classes of features have been offered as one possible explanation for a natural kind (e.g., dog, carrot) and artifact (e.g., hammer, car) dissociation that has been observed in Alzheimer's disease (Devlin, Gonnerman, Andersen, & Seidenberg, 1998; Gonnerman et al., 1997; Mazzoni, Moretti, Lucchini, Vista, & Muratorio, 1991; Silveri et al., 1991) and herpes simplex patients (e.g., Pietrini et al., 1988) . In this dissociation, it has been found that people are more likely to be able to name items from artifact than natural kind categories. Silveri et al. (1991) and Mazzoni et al. (1991) , for example, offered an explanation of the dissociation based on this idea. The explanation had three main assumptions: (1) perceptual features are localized in the temporo-limbic region of the brain and functional features are localized in the fronto-parietal region of the brain, (2) the temporo-limbic region of the brain is affected before the fronto-parietal region in Alzheimer's disease, and (3) natural kind items are more highly correlated with perceptual than functional features, whereas artifact items are more highly correlated with functional than perceptual features (Farah & McClelland, 1991; Warrington & McCarthy, 1983 , 1987 . Based on these assumptions, it was suggested that people show a greater natural kind than artifact impairment in Alzheimer's disease because damage speciªcity initially causes a greater loss of perceptual than functional features. This loss affects natural kind items more than artifact items because of the greater dependence that natural kind items have on perceptual features for naming.
After examining the performance of 15 Alzheimer's disease patients, Gonnerman et al. (1997) disputed the claim that category-speciªc deªcits in Alzheimer's disease were caused by early damage affecting the temporo-limbic region of the brain. This claim was based on the observation that some of their patients who displayed only mild symptoms were able to name natural kind items better than artifact items. Gonnerman et al., suggested that such a result could not be explained by early damage affecting localized perceptual features. Gonnerman et al. (1997) offered an explanation based on two correlational properties of items and their features. First, they suggested that different features can affect the naming of items differently, depending on the distribution of features. In particular, features that are speciªc to few items are more likely to improve recall than features that many items share. Second, they suggested that damage would affect items differently, depending on the intercorrelations between features. At low levels of damage, items with highly intercorrelated features would be resistant to damage, due to collateral support from other intercorrelated features. At high levels of damage, however, a different pattern should be found. Because the features are highly correlated, the entire set of items reliant on the features would be lost due to the loss of the mutual support among individual items. Items that do not have highly intercorrelated feature sets would not show such a pattern. They would show a more linear pattern of degradation. In this case, because the individual items would be learned in such a way that they would have only a small dependence on other items for recall, performance would be related mainly to the extent of the damage between the individual items and their features. Because natural kind items have features that are more highly correlated than artifact items, Gonnerman et al. suggested that such a relationship might be able to explain why a double dissociation between natural kind and artifact items has been found.
Computational modeling has also provided insight into the understanding of category-speciªc loss. One of the earlier models of such dissociations was that of Farah and McClelland (1991) . Their model was based on three major assumptions: (1) category-speciªc deªcits occur because of differential damage to modality speciªc areas, (2) visual (perceptual) and functional semantic features were anatomically separate and could, therefore, be affected independently by damage, and (3) due to the statistical properties of artifact and natural kind items (classiªed as nonliving and living in their study), damage to one of the feature types could cause a loss to occur predominantly in one of the categories.
To show how such a property could lead to a different level of impairment of items from different categories, Farah and McClelland (1991) constructed a connectionist model that used a separate set of functional and visual feature units. When they damaged some of the visual or functional semantic units, the predicted dissociation occurred. Damaging the visual feature units degraded the network's performance on natural kind items, whereas damaging the functional feature units degraded the network's performance on artifact items. Interestingly, they also found that losing features in one modality could impair the retrieval of other features used predominantly with the same category in a different modality. These observations were taken as evidence that category-speciªcity could be an emergent property of a larger system and that losing features from one modality could cause category-speciªc deªcits to occur. Devlin et al. (1998) extended Farah and McClelland's (1991) approach by constructing a model that incorporated the two assumptions of Gonnerman et al. (1997) , as previously discussed. To do this, they implemented a connectionist model of the processes that map semantics to phonology. Their model consisted of a set of semantic and phonological nodes that were directly connected without hidden nodes. Each of the two layers were attached to "clean-up" nodes (Hinton & Shallice, 1991) , however. The network was trained to learn the relationships from semantics to phonology and from phonology to semantics. Three techniques were used to "damage" their network. The ªrst involved randomly removing a proportion of the weights between the semantic and semantic clean-up nodes. The second involved removing some of the semantic clean-up nodes. The third, which was designed to replicate Farah and McClelland (1991) , removed units speciªc to either perceptual or functional features.
The results Devlin et al. (1998) found from damaging their network showed that the technique that most closely approximated the pattern observed in Alzheimer's disease was the gradual removal of the clean-up weights between the semantic and semantic clean-up nodes. In their overall simulations, their model replicated the pattern found in Gonnerman et al.'s (1997) Alzheimer's patients. When a relatively small proportion of the weights were removed, the model exhibited a small natural kind over artifact advantage. When a larger proportion of the weights were removed, however, the trend was reversed. The model displayed an artifact over natural kind advantage. There were individual simulations that did not conform to this pattern, however. Twelve out of 50 of their simulations always showed an artifact over natural kind advantage. One simulation showed an artifact advantage that turned into a natural kind advantage. Devlin et al., suggested that this kind of variability in the simulations showed that the double dissociation between artifact and natural kind items could be due to individual differences in damage speciªcity and correlational differences between item types. Devlin et al.'s (1998) simulation work is certainly appealing. However, after successful computational simulation, it is necessary to investigate the model such that the underlying principles that deserve credit or blame for the performance are uncovered (Stone & Van Orden, 1994) . Thus it is useful to ªnd out which are the fundamental principles behind the results and which are merely idiosyncratic properties of the model. In the present case, it is important to ask whether the model is representative of a real semantic system. A number of factors could have contributed to the results that might be extraneous to the theoretical interpretation.
First, the amount of variance in the networks could be important in the pattern of results obtained. It has been shown that the pattern of results taken from networks of the type Devlin et al. (1998) used can differ, depending on the number of hidden nodes used. In particular, greater numbers of hidden nodes represent greater degrees of freedom in the network (Hornik, Stinchcombe, & White, 1989) . If the number of clean-up units present in the intact model varied, such variability might lead to a different pattern of results. In this case, the different amount of variance could change the relationships in the data learned by the network. It is therefore necessary to ask whether the results are independent of the number of hidden nodes in the network or are speciªc to a certain subset. If the results are speciªc to a certain subset, there needs to be some principled explanation of why such an amount of nodes was chosen.
Second, any model of a semantic system needs to be able to generalize to novel exemplars. For example, if someone sees a cat that is slightly different from the previous cats he or she has seen, that person still needs to respond that it is a cat (for instance, a cat with no fur is still a cat). Any computational model of a semantic system that does not have at least the rudimentary aspects of this property must be considered at best problematic. It would suggest that the relationships learned by the model from the data are not necessarily similar to those that would be learned by a person.
Third, the pattern of results displayed by the model should remain similar if the model is expanded to deal with a larger data set (Feldman-Stewart & Mewhort, 1994) , or conversely, larger size data sets could be used to start off with. We therefore need to know whether Devlin et al.'s (1998) network would display the same pattern of results if more data patterns were used, or whether more exemplars would change the statistical properties of the network to the extent that the previous pattern of results would no longer be displayed.
Fourth, the learning algorithm needs to learn the relationships between the domains in a way that is not inconsistent with any major underlying factor of semantic organization (Joordens & Besner, 1994) . If an algorithm learns in a way that is not representative of people, small nuances in the relationships learned, such as those examined by Devlin et al. (1998) , are difªcult to interpret. They may be idiosyncratic to the algorithm and not properties of a real semantic system.
SIMULATION 1. DOES VARYING THE NUMBER OF SEMANTIC CLEAN-UP NODES CHANGE THE PATTERN OF RESULTS?
To examine whether changing the number of nodes in the network would change performance on natural kind and artifact naming, four networks were trained. The networks had the same structure as those in Devlin et al. (1998) except that three of them had a different number (5, 10, and 30) of semantic clean-up nodes. The networks were trained with the quick propagation algorithm (Fahlman, 1988 ) using a modiªed version of the NevProp neural network simulator on Devlin et al.'s data set.
1 The data set had ªve categories, fruits and vegetables, animals, vehicles, clothing, and tools. The animals and the fruits and vegetables categories were collapsed to form natural kinds. Vehicles, clothing, and tools were collapsed to form artifacts.
The error criterion for judging a pattern correct was also changed from Devlin et al. (1998) . Patterns were considered correct if the absolute difference between the target pattern and the output nodes was smaller than 0.5 for all nodes at the phoneme level. This was opposed to considering a pattern correct by using a closest match scheme with the entire set of exemplars. This was done for the following reason. Because the Devlin et al. model claims to be a model of semantics to phonology, and because the phonological representation of their network presumably represents a set of phonemes, the error criterion they used does not seem particularly plausible. It seems unreasonable to consider an answer correct if it is far from the word's phonology (such as saying drot for dot).
Unlike most previous simulations using back propagation and quick propagation, no bias values were used, due to problems in interpreting how they should be damaged. Node values that were not initially activated by a training pattern were set to 0.3.
2 Training was considered complete once all exemplars produced an absolute error of less than 0.2 at the output nodes. Testing was performed in the same way as Devlin et al. (1998) , where the model was allowed to run for 38 cycles before the outputs were examined.
Results
Training was stopped at 149, 139, 147, and 179 epochs for the 5, 10, 20, and 30 semantic clean-up node networks, respectively. The networks were not able to learn 100% of the data set before training was stopped. There were still 4, 2, 1, and 1 phonology-to-semantics exemplars that were incorrect according to the 0.2 error criteria for the 5, 10, 20, and 30 semantic clean-up node networks, respectively. All of the semantics-to-phonology exemplars were learned correctly. The networks were damaged in the same manner as Devlin et al. (1998) , where the weights to and from the semantic clean-up nodes were randomly removed until only 5% were left. This was done 50 times for each network. Figure 1 shows the overall pattern of performance of the networks after damage.
The network with 20 semantic clean-up nodes produced the most similar result to that of the Devlin et al. (1998) network. There was a small initial natural kind over artifact advantage that later changed into an artifact over natural kind advantage. Although the initial artifact advantage was not present in Devlin et al.'s overall mean results, the simulations reported here did not have as many individual simulations where there was always an artifact over natural kind advantage (5 in this simulation, 12 in Devlin et al.'s) . Therefore, the overall mean was more consistent with Devlin et al.'s pattern after they removed the individual simulations that always produced an artifact advantage. The results are also consistent with Gonnerman et al.'s (1997) claim that most Alzheimer's disease patients initially show a mild artifact over natural kinds deªcit that later turns into a larger natural kind over artifacts deªcit.
Changing the number of semantic clean-up nodes altered the pattern of results, however. In particular, the results of the other networks seemed to show rather different patterns. The networks with 5 and 30 semantic clean-up nodes displayed virtually no difference between natural kind and artifact naming at any stage of damage. The 10 semantic clean-up node network displayed the reverse pattern-artifact items were named more poorly than natural kind items. This would suggest that Devlin et al.'s (1998) results were speciªc to the network having a particular number of clean-up nodes (i.e., 20). This casts doubt on the generality of their results. It is difªcult to tell whether their results are representative of an underlying semantic property or whether they were caused by idiosyncratic properties speciªc to the network architecture used. Clearly, the statistical properties of the natural kind and artifact correlations they discussed, and how they affect itemnaming performance after damage, are not general to the type of network used.
An examination of individual patterns produced by each of the networks that always showed an advantage for either natural kind or artifact items was performed. This was done to see whether small subsets of patterns could have meaningfully changed the pattern of overall results. The criterion was the same as that used by Devlin et al. (1998) , where the difference between natural kind and artifact naming was examined at speciªc cycles. The only group to show a substantial number of patterns that always went in one direction was the 10-node network. The pattern of those simulations was for natural kind items to show an advantage over artifact items, however. It therefore appears unlikely that a small number of patterns in any of the simulations were signiªcantly changing the overall mean results in such a way as to invalidate the observations. Table 1 shows the results from the networks on this and some of the other tasks described below.
SIMULATION 2. GENERALIZATION PERFORMANCE
To test whether the network was able to generalize to novel examples, 60 new exemplars were constructed. This was done by duplicating the previous 60 exemplars and randomly turning one feature off and another feature on. The exemplars therefore represented only slight variations of the previous set. The generalization performance was 78, 92, 83, and 78%, for the 5, 10, 20, and 30 semantic clean-up node networks, respectively. Interestingly, the generalization performance was worse on natural kind compared to artifact items on all four networks. This suggests that it could not have been highly informative artifact features that were changed in the testing set that were causing the degradation in generalization performance.
An important aspect of the results is that on the testing set, the networks produced answers that differed from any in the training set. This is not what people do-they either give the name of an item they know, offer some sort of "likeness" rating (Malt & Johnson, 1992) , or produce no answer (e.g., I don't know 3 ). This property is not necessarily general to all types of network, however. Networks from the adaptive resonance family (see Grossberg, 1987, and Carpenter & Grossberg, 1987 , for a discussion of this type of network) have been shown to generalize well and learn in a robust manner. They can also give an "unknown" response, in which case the output response is inhibited.
An argument that could be made about the testing exemplars used is that the one-off one-on scheme could have made the set so dissimilar to the training set that it was an unrealistic test of the network. In this case, because the training exemplars only had an average of eight features active for each item, turning one off and another on may have signiªcantly altered the statistical properties of the test set so much as to not allow any meaningful comparison with the original training set.
To make sure that the generalization performance of the previous networks were due to their architecture, and not the testing set, an ART 1 network (Carpenter & Grossberg, 1987) was trained using a vigilance value of 1.0. This caused the network to generate 60 nodes, one for each pattern in the training set. The 60 testing exemplars were then run through the model. Only one was classiªed into a category that was not the one that the exemplar had been generated from. The exemplar generated from a shovel was classiªed as a hoe. This result suggests that it was not a problem of the testing exemplars used that were causing the Devlin et al. (1998) style networks to generalize in the fashion they did. Rather, the generalization performance of the Devlin et al. networks was a property of the type of network and architecture used.
SIMULATION 3. DO ADDITIONAL EXEMPLARS CHANGE THE PATTERN OF RESULTS?
To examine whether the results of Devlin et al. (1998) were speciªc to a particular data set, 60 new exemplars were added to the training set. The new exemplars were those previously used to test the generalization performance. The statistical pattern where artifact items had more informative features than natural kind items remained intact. This was measured using the informative criterion of Devlin et al., where items were considered informative if they were used in fewer exemplars than the overall mean. Because twice as many exemplars were used to train the network (with the same number of inputs), it meant that the mean informative criterion used was half that of the 60-exemplar networks. Overall, natural kind items had an average of 2.5 informative features and artifact items 3.3. If back-propagation-type networks degrade differently depending on the strength of the intercorrelations between feature types, as claimed, this property should still exist. It should be noted that the following simulation tests the general claim that degradation differences due to correlational characteristics exist in back-propagationstyle networks and not the more speciªc claim that given a data set with a speciªc set of correlational information, trained on a network with a speciªc number of degrees of freedom (hidden units), a certain pattern will emerge. The network architecture was changed because none of the previous architectures were able to learn the entire data set from semantics to phonology. In the new network, 24 phonemic clean-up and 40 semantic clean-up nodes were used. These were chosen after some experimentation. 4 The network was trained for 1140 cycles, at which stage training was stopped because the network's performance had reached an asymptote. Two exemplars still produced errors in the semantics to phonology direction. The network was then damaged in the same way as the previous networks. This damaging process was repeated 50 times. The mean overall performance of the network at different levels of damage is presented in Figure 2 .
The network was not able to replicate the critical dissociation pattern. No natural kind over artifact advantage was found at any stage of damage. Even when eight simulations that showed a natural kind over artifact impairment for the ªrst 20 cycles were removed, no advantage was found for natural kinds. This could have been due to a number of factors. For instance, it could be due to the number of clean-up nodes used or because two of the patterns had errors to start with. Similarly, it might be due to the statistical properties of the data set that may have been changed by adding the 60 new exemplars. However, both explanations highlight a problem with this domain and network type: Small effects like those Devlin et al. (1998) examined are particularly reliant on the speciªcs of the network architecture. A ªne-grained analysis of the nodes and their properties would be needed to resolve this issue.
SIMULATION 4. DOES THE ALGORITHM LEARN IN A WAY THAT CAN BE CONCEIVABLY COMPARED WITH A HUMAN SEMANTIC SYSTEM?
One property of the learning algorithm that would have affected Devlin et al.'s (1998) results was the way error was reduced in the network. In particular, the error reduction method would have reduced the error relative to the amount of overlap between the training exemplars in the input and output representation. Such overlap has been shown to cause differences in the speed of learning in both structured (e.g., Plaut, McClelland, Seidenberg, & Patterson, 1996) and arbitrary (e.g., Joordens & Besner, 1994; Kawamoto, Farrar, & Kello, 1994) domains. This leads to an interesting prediction: Exemplars that share multiple features with others at the input representation will be harder to learn than exemplars that share few. This is because the network will have fewer distinguishing features to help it learn the mapping between the two domains.
It is unlikely that that is what happens when people encounter exemplars that share multiple features. In fact, Rosch, Simpson, and Miller (1976) have shown that people display the opposite pattern. People are faster to recall a prototypical member of a category than one that is not prototypical. If it is assumed that some of the basis of prototypicality is feature overlap, this is the opposite of what Devlin et al.'s (1998) network would predict. Their network will have the most difªculty learning prototypical members of a group, because such exemplars will experience interference during learning due to other category members with similar features.
It could be argued that the discussed results are from experimental tasks that are too divergent from the model to make predictions from, because the Rosch et al. (1976) experiments were categorization tasks. However, Jolicoeur, Gluck, and Kosslyn (1984) investigated the naming speed of pictures that were either atypical or typical of a basic level category (experiment 3). The results they found showed that typical items were named faster than atypical ones (1002 versus 1138 msec). The difference was signiªcant. Clearly, this suggests that atypical items are not faster to name than typical ones. This is unlike the network-unless there is a property where items with a slower learning rate that produce more error on any given cycle of learning are responded to the fastest. Similarly, Howard and Best (1995) have examined this prediction in aphasic patients, also using a picture-naming task. Of their 18 patients, none was able to name nonprototypical items more accurately than prototypical items. However there were patients who were better at naming prototypical than nonprototypical items. From the previous tasks it seems that prototypical items are faster to name, are learned better, and are quicker to categorize than nonprototypical items.
To test the major argument of the preceding section, a small example network was constructed. In this network, two different types of training patterns were used, one that overlapped at the input layer (ambiguous) and one that did not (unambiguous) . If overlap at the input level slows learning times, this should be observed by the network producing different error rates for the two types of pattern. If it is not a property of individual item learning, no differences should be found.
Ambiguity Network
The data set consisted of eight patterns, each of which mapped onto 13 input and 8 output nodes. Each data pattern activated a single output node. The ªrst four patterns each activated two nodes in the input layer that none of the other exemplars activated. Thus the mapping between input and output domains was unambiguous. The next four patterns also activated two input nodes. However, the two input nodes activated were staggered such that one of the activated inputs overlapped with one of the activated inputs of another exemplar. Thus the input domain was ambiguous. Six hidden nodes were used. 5 The network was trained using the quick propagation algorithm with the same parameters as those used to train the previous networks. This was done 10 times, using the NevProp neural network simulator.
It can be seen from Figure 3 that the ambiguous vectors were more difªcult to learn than the unambiguous vectors. Apart from the ªrst seven cycles at the beginning of learning, the root mean summed squared error was greater for the ambiguous vectors, although the difference became small, due to the amount of learning done by the network.
Because the algorithm reduced error in a way similar to the Devlin et al. (1998) network, it would suggest that the Devlin et al. network would have also been learning in such a fashion and thus that learning would have proceeded in a different fashion than in people. Such differences would have affected the distribution of weights and therefore the item correlations learned by the model. This would suggest that any such correlations found in the data are difªcult to interpret, particularly those producing small effects such as the natural kind advantage at low levels of damage. If the network learns the examples in a way clearly different from that of people, how can we possibly be sure that the correlations would still be representative of a person's semantic system? It could be argued that this effect would not be observable, due to overlearning of the exemplars. The difference between the ambiguous and nonambiguous groups would therefore be assumed to be negligible, as seen at later cycles of learning. However, this could not be the case. If this was true, reaction times to pictures from different categories (and frequencies) would all be the same. A similar problem in a slightly different domain has been examined by Joordens and Besner (1994) . Therefore, it would be reasonable to suggest that such a pattern of error reduction is an underlying property of the type of network-learning algorithm used and that this property is not shared by people. There may be other algorithms that show a more plausible error reduction pattern, such as that used by Kawamoto et al. (1994) , but these lead to quantitatively and qualitatively different results.
DISCUSSION
The main goal of this study was to investigate whether previous connectionist models were adequately modeling the process of picture naming. In particular, this study examined some of the ªne-grain effects that have been reported from computational models and whether the analogy these models make to a human semantic system was plausible.
An examination of a previous model of the semantic system (Devlin et al., 1998) showed that a number of basic tests had not been performed on it. Four basic tests that any model of the semantic system should be able to at least simplistically perform were proposed: (1) The model should be able to generalize to new exemplars, (2) the model should be expandable to realistically sized training sets, (3) the performance of the model should not be unduly affected by small changes in architecture, and (4) the learning algorithm should produce results that are not inconsistent with any major underlying factor of semantic organization. The model was then tested on these criteria. The results of the model showed that it had difªculty on all four tasks. This makes previous results obtained from the model difªcult to evaluate. They could be due to the hypothesized cause, or they could be due to idiosyncratic properties of the model.
Perhaps the biggest shortcoming of the model was that it assumed it was possible to model the picture-naming task using a single network mapping a feature representation to a phonological one. This seems like an extremely large simpliªcation, given the complexities of the task (Levelt, 1989 ). This does not mean that a network approach to semantic modeling could not be useful, however. In particular, the ART networks (e.g., Carpenter & Grossberg, 1987; Grossberg, 1976a Grossberg, , 1976b Grossberg, , 1980 Grossberg, , 1987 Grossberg & Stone, 1986 ) have a number of attractive properties for semantic modeling. These properties include a lesser susceptibility to instability caused by increases in training set size and small deviations in the statistical properties of the data set. It is also likely that the learning algorithm would lead to a more plausible solution with respect to the activation of individual items-favoring prototypical exemplars. Other more general differences between ART and back-propagationtype networks are discussed in Grossberg (1987) .
The ART networks also have an advantage speciªc to picture naming: They would allow the task to be modeled as a categorization task involving the retrieval of a representation from the semantic system rather than as a mapping task between features and phonology. This distinction can be understood by examining whether the picture-naming task is modeling speciªc word retrieval from semantics or modeling categorization to a basic category exemplar from semantic feature information (e.g., Malt, 1989; Murphy & Wisniewski, 1989; Rosch et al., 1976) . In particular, in the Devlin et al. (1998) network, one set of semantic features mapped onto one phonological pronunciation. It is possible that such a property exists in the semantic system such that people can recall speciªc words. It is unlikely that this is what is happening in the picture-naming task. In such a task, it has been assumed that categorization occurs to the closest basic category exemplar, rather than just the recall of a speciªc exemplar associated with a particular word (e.g., Johnson & Mervis, 1997; Jolicoeur et al., 1984) . If a superordinate or subordinate decision is needed, it is likely that this occurs after basic category identiªcation. Even when the task is biased toward superordinate identiªcation, basic-level categorization is still the fastest (Murphy & Wisniewski, 1989) .
In addition, it has also been shown that basic-level categorization occurs even when the basic-level categories have longer names and are learned later in life than the individual items of which they are a superordinate (Murphy & Brownell, 1985) . Similarly, when there is progressive damage to the semantic system, people tend to lose information relating to speciªc concepts as their symptoms become more severe and can then only recall more general information (Hodges, Patterson, Graham, & Dawson, 1996) . It seems, therefore, that the picture-naming task involves at least the categorization of an object into an appropriate category and then the retrieval of its pronunciation rather than just choosing a speciªc pattern of phonology from semantic features without some form of classiªcation.
In sum, this paper used a set of networks similar to the one in Devlin et al. (1998) to examine some underlying computational principles of semantic modeling. Although the type of networks used were found to be deªcient in a number of areas, the simulations did allow for the principles proposed to be explicitly stated. The simulations also highlighted the need to understand the characteristics of the architecture and algorithms used to train the networks and how these might affect the pattern of results produced.
